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I thought that type of repression happened only in other countries, that
it took place in Central America, that it occurred in Argentina, but not
in a democracy like ours. That there were disappeared persons in
Colombia, that the army disappeared them and that a dirty war was
being waged, I was not conscious of that, I lived in another country.,
It is difficult to sum up the life of a country which is rich in history,
culture and people. It is even harder to write about the dark side of a country,
particularly when events such as the assassination of friends and people we
never knew is a part of daily living. This is the ugly side of Colombia, but a
story that must be told -repeatedly- until it is banished to the past.
'Researcher with the Iter-Amerioao Legg Services Association (hwslto Latinoamericano de
Servicies Legales AlRernativos, ILSA)The author wishes to thank Robet Volterra, Canadian lawyer
specializing in corporate law and fidernational human rights, and Roberto Molina, Colombian
lawyer and researcher for the Andean Commission of Jurists Colombian Section (Comisi6n Andina
de Juristas, Seccional Colombiana), for reviewing and commenting this article.
I Lalinde, Testimonio de Una Madre Angustiada, in UNA VIDA POX LA VIDA. TESTMoNIos
SOBRE LA VIDA Y OBRA DE HtcroI ABAD G6MEz 80 (P. Juten ed. 1989)(this and all other
translations are the author's).
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I. INTRODUCTION
When human rights monitors in Colombia are called upon to describe the
situation of political violence and human rights violations in the country, we tend
to begin by affirming that, similar to other modem nations, Colombia is a nation
of contradictions.
Colombia is considered to be a formal democracy, as exemplified by its
periodic political elections. Unlike most Latin American countries, where
military dictatorships were once the norm, Colombia has remained under civilian
rule. In further contrast, Colombia has had a relatively stable economy despite
the external debt crisis of the 1980s, which in neighboring countries was
synonymous with spiralling inflation and currency devaluation.2
Yet, within this context of formal democracy and stable economy,
Colombia has paradoxically suffered from a generalized situation of violence.3
Colombia has one of the oldest guerrilla movements in the continent. Among
the main groups are the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), the
National Liberation Army (ELN), and the recently demobilized April 19th
Movement (M-19) and Popular Liberation Army (EPL). The guerrilla conflict
has lasted almost 40 years. Furthermore, Colombia also suffers the
consequences of a phenomenon of violent delinquency, with one of the highest
murder rates in the world. In fact, murder is the leading cause of death among
adults.4 Yet, the sector most known internationally for its violence are the drug
trafficking cartels, which in August 1989 declared war against the Colombian
state.
II. THE PARADOX OF COLOMBIA'S HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION
This contradictory situation of violence within a framework of formal
2 According to the World Bank, Colombia has one of the most dynamic economies in Latin
America. Economic disparities, however, are as extreme as in neighboring countries: 40% of all
Colombians live in "absolute poverty" and another 18% in "absolute misery." See WASHINGTON
OFFICE ON LATIN AmERICA (hereinafter WOLA), COLOMBIA BESIEGED: POLITICALVIOLENCEAND
STATE RESPONSIBILITY 7-10 (1989).
' Colombia's recent history was characterized by severe political disputes which reached its
climax in the 20th century with the civil war known as "La Violencia." This struggle for political
power in the late 1940s and early 1950s resulted in the death of some 200,000 Colombians
(according to conservative estimates) and was resolved with a political agreement between the
traditional Liberal and Conservative parties known as the "National Front." This pact consisted in
the sharing and alternating of political power between these two parties. Id. at 12-16. Not all social
and political sectors in Colombia were satisfied with the National Front, thus leading to the
formation of guerrilla insurgent groups, known to be the oldest on the continent.
' According to certain statistics, murder is the first cause of death for men between the ages of
15 and 45. Id. at 1. Annually, there are an average of 20,000 murders reported, including political
assassinations. In 1990, 24,615 murders were reported. Each year about 3,000 of these victims
of violence are considered "N.N.," unidentified, and deposited in common graves. Quinn, La
Mirada de Tne, CRONOS, May 6, 1991, at 22.
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democracy has led to another paradox: over the past 40 years, while the country
has been governed by civilian rule, there has simultaneously been an almost
uninterrupted government-declared state of emergency - the so-called "state of
siege". This situation has allowed for the creation of an exceptional justice
system (that is, specialized courts for trying crimes of "terrorism" known as
"public order tribunals"), the limitation of civil liberties and judicial guarantees,
and, particularly over the past decade, a situation of systemic human rights
violations.
Just to give an example, over the past three years, on an annual average,
there have been more political, or allegedly political, assassinations and
disappearances in Colombia than in the 17 years of General Augusto Pinochet's
dictatorship in Chile. In 1990, there were 2,311 reported political, or allegedly
political, assassinations in Colombia, and 217 enforced or involuntary
disappearances. 5 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission named by Chilean
President Patricio Aylwin reported that 2,279 people were victims of General
Pinochet's 17-year military dictatorship: 164 were considered victims of political
violence and 2,115 of human rights violations.6 This comparison demonstrates
that human rights violations not only take place under authoritarian or defacto
totalitarian regimes. One must question why they take place under elected
civilian governments such as the government of Colombia.
The situation of systemic violations of human rights in Colombia is multi-
faceted and has evolved during the past 15 years. In the late 1970s, human
rights abuses were characterized by the systemic practice of torture and arbitrary
detentions. In the early 1980s, human rights groups documented an increase in
extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances coupled with the emergence
of parastate generators of violence (known as paramilitary groups or death
squads). 7 Beginning in 1988, and continuing up to the present, a new and
horrifying form of violence predominated among the individual abuses described
above: collective massacres of groups of four or more people
5 CENTRO DE INVESTIGACION Y EDUCACI6N POPULAR, BANCO DE DATOS DEL CINEP (Jan.
1991).
6 COMISI6N ANDINA DE JURISTAS, INFORMATIVO ANDINO, No. 52, INFORME RETrIG 4,5
(1991).
7 See generally IRRUPCI6N DEL PARAESTADO, ENSAYOS SOBRE LA CRISIS COLOMBIANA (G.
Palacio ed. 1990).
" Between 1970 and 1979, 51,080 detentions or arrests and 833 extrajudicial executions were
registered in Colombia. Between 1980 and 1989, the number of detentions dropped to 23,258, the
number of executions soared to 11,723, and 1,080 enforced or involuntary disappearances were
registered. See COMISI6N ANDINA DE JURISTAS SECCIONAL COLOMBIANA, DETRAS DEL
TERRORISMO Y LA "GUERRA AL NARCOTRAFICO": Los DERECHOS HUMANOS EN COLOMBIA AL
INICIO DEL NUEvo GOBIERNO (1990).
1991]
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A. State Responsibility
According to international and Colombian human rights organizations -
including the U.N. Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances,
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
Amnesty International, Americas Watch, and the Washington Office on Latin
America - the Colombian state is internationally responsible for the human rights
crisis affecting the country on two accounts. First, international human rights
norms provide that a state is responsible for guaranteeing the full enjoyment of
human rights by its citizens. This enjoyment by its citizens is not guaranteed by
the Colombian state. Furthermore, known cases of human rights violations have
not been brought to justice. This means that the Colombian state has failed in
its responsibility to its own citizens according to international human rights
law.9 Second, there is sufficient evidence available which indicates direct and
indirect involvement by the Colombian state in human rights violations. This
includes acts committed by paramilitary groups, which in the 1980s have been
accused of committing the majority of the country's assassinations. According
to a recent report by Americas Watch:
[T]he Colombian government has done too little to work through
these complexities to identify, prosecute and punish those behind
the political violence. This failing has been greatest in
acknowledging the role of military and security forces in the
killings. These forces continue to commit violent abuses
themselves, and to condone and support killings by paramilitary
groups.
10
Paramilitary groups offer an effective camouflage for the Colombian state's
involvement in human rights abuses, as do enforced or involuntary
disappearances. Both modalities prove useful in obscuring responsibility for
human rights abuses from superficial enquiry.
' Colombia's commitment to international human rights norms is clearly stated in Article 93 of
its Constitution. See CONSTITUCI6N POLUTICA DE COLOMBIA (1991). Article 93, Title II, Chapter
4, reads in relevant part:
The treaties and international conventions ratified by Congress, that recognize
human rights and prohibit their limitation in a state of emergency, prevail in the
domestic legal order .... The rights and duties consecrated in this Charter will
be interpreted in conformity with the international human rights treaties ratified by
Colombia (editors' translation).
See also Article 12 (prohibiting forced dissapearences, torture, and cruel, degrading or inhuman
treatment or punishment); Article 28 (prohibiting arbitrary detention, arrest, imprisonment, and
warrantless searches of the domicile); Article 29 (excluding evidence obtained in violation of due
process); Article 213 (prohibiting military tribunals from judging civilians). Colombia has signed
and ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as its Optional
Protocol, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
10 AMERICAS WATCH, THE "DRUG WAR" IN COLOMBIA, THE NEGLECTED TRAGEDY OF
POLITICAL VIOLENCE 1 (1990).
[VOL. 1
Human Rights, Justice and U.S. Aid in Colombia
B. Paramilitary Cover-ups
State complicity with the paramilitary groups was made public as early as
1983 when a government report on the first such group - Death to Kidnappers,
MAS - showed that 59 members of the military forces were implicated in
paramilitary activity. However, no measures were taken to remove these
officers from military service or to punish them."
Recent reports on Colombia only reaffirm the conclusion that members
of the military and police are involved in paramilitary groups. These
paramilitary groups now number 137.12 According to Amos Wako, U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions:
The majority of assassinations and killings committed by
paramilitary groups take place in heavily militarized areas. The
paramilitary groups may move about with ease in these areas and
commit their assassinations with impunity . . . . [I]n some cases
the military or police officers feign ignorance to the doings of the
paramilitary groups, support them granting safeconducts to their
members or by impeding investigations. 3
The composition of paramilitary groups and the involvement of state security
forces was confirmed by the United States Congress' Committee on Government
Operations, which stated in a February 1990 report: "[T]he traffickers supply
the funds to hire the paramilitary groups, the Colombian military supplies the
arms and members of the local elite provide an air of legitimacy.. "14
Indeed, paramilitaries, disappearances, and state omission and involvement
translate into one word describing the Colombian system of justice: Impunity.
III. THE GOVERNMENT'S ANSWER TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
The response of successive Colombian governments to the problem of
human rights violations has been to continually deny its responsibility. For
example, under President Julio C6sar Turbay Ayala (1978-1982), when the
practice of torturing prisoners was widespread, the government declared that
these prisoners suffered not from torture but from self-flagellation; that is, they
tortured themselves. The government of President Belisario Betancur (1982-
t See WOLA, supra note 2, at 74.
12 In September 1987, the then Interior Minister, C6sar Gaviria Trujillo, publicly announced
the existence of 137 paramilitary groups. See id. at 62.
13 Inforine Oficial, Ejecuciones Arbitrarias en Colombia, U.N. ESCOR, Amos Wako, Relator
Especial, E/CNI1990/22/Add.1, para. 63 (1990).
"' THIRTEENTH REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS TOGETHER wrrH
ADDITIONAL VIEWS, STOPPING :HE FLOOD OF COCAINE WITH OPERATION SNOWCAP: IS IT
WORKING? 86 (1990).
1991]
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1986) found a convenient scapegoat for the country's situation of political
violence and human rights violations by blaming the paramilitary groups and
what were euphemistically called "dark forces."
Recently, the governments of President Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) and
President C6sar Gaviria Trujillo (1990- ), while recognizing "isolated" cases
of human rights abuses for which the state is accountable, have promoted the
image of the state as a victim of violence and not a cause. The blame has been
placed almost entirely upon the drug traffickers, paramilitary groups, and the
guerrilla insurgents. By taking the position that the state is a victim they have
rationalized their governments' concomitant inactivity. In fact, the notion that
actors outside of the state are entirely responsible for the situation of violence
and the human rights crisis in Colombia has been accepted internationally. This
is reflected, for example, in stories printed in the international press.
1 5
Although it is true that the drug traffickers and guerrillas are responsible to a
certain degree for the situation of violence, recent government "discourse" to
explain this situation hides a greater reality of human rights violations: the "dirty
war."
A. Colombia's Dirty War
Perhaps one of the most serious and ironically "eloquent" examples of
total disregard of basic human rights and international humanitarian law by
government forces is the case of the "holocaust" of the Palace of Justice. On
November 6, 1985 the M-19 guerrillas took over the Palace of Justice in
Bogota, holding magistrates and judges hostage, and called for a trial against the
government of Belisario Betancur for violating a cease-fire agreement during
ailing peace talks. Members of the International Committee of the Red Cross,
among others, tried to intervene to hold negotiations between the government
and the guerrillas. The President of the Supreme Court, who was being held
captive by the guerrillas echoed this plea to negotiate. The government stated
that it had other ways of resolving the situation. Forty-eight hours later, the
Palace of Justice was aflame, most of the members of the Supreme Court -
including its President - were dead, as were the majority of the guerrillas. To
date the government has not brought this case to justice nor has it explained the
disappearance of eleven persons following the government takeover of the Palace
of Justice.16 For many analysts, the incident of the Palace of Justice marked
the turning point in the detriment of Colombia's human rights situation. The
armed forces established as a fact what had been their expectation: that they
could take extreme measures to stop insurgency, in this case guerrillas, and
" "In the United States, the human rights tragedy of Colombia has been overshadowed by, and
often confused with, the Medellfn cartel's violent response to President Barco's initiatives to bring
them to justice and extradite them to the United States." AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 10, at 129.
1 See WOLA, supra note 3, at 27-28.
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would not be held accountable for their actions.1 7
As stated earlier, recent cases of human rights violations have included
extrajudicial executions and political assassinations, enforced or involuntary
disappearances, and the practice of torture. Another form of repression used by
state forces, paramilitary groups and the euphemistic "dark forces" has been the
use of death threats against political and social organizers and opposition figures.
Among those targeted recently are the very people who work toward
guaranteeing the rights of Colombian citizens: human rights monitors.
B. Attacks on Human Rights Monitors
One such case of attacks by the state against human rights monitors,
which represents the beginning of a back-lash against these groups, is the
detention and disappearance of Alirio de Jestis Pedraza Becerra - human rights
defense attorney and member of the Committee in Solidarity with Political
Prisoners (CSPP). On July 4, 1990, Pedraza was apprehended by eight heavily
armed men dressed in plainclothes when he exited a shopping center in Bogota.
Eye-witnesses stated that just before Pedraza was forced into a vehicle and
driven away, two uniformed police officers tried to intervene on his behalf, yet
were dissuaded from doing so when two of the armed men flashed state security
forces identification cards. To date the whereabouts of Pedraza are unknown.
Furthermore, the two police officers who witnessed his disappearance have
refused to reveal their identify and offer testimony, thus impeding further
investigations into this case.'
8
Following Pedraza's disappearance, several human rights monitors in
various cities in the country received death threats, many referring to Pedraza's
fate and warning these monitors that they could receive similar treatment.
Several human rights workers have thus been forced to leave the cities they live
in; some have even left the country.
I? On October 30, 1990, the Attorney General's office (Procuradurfa General de la Naci6n, a
government office in charge of checking irregularities committed by state employees, including
human rights abuses committed by state security forces) called for the destitution of retired General
Jesds Armando Arias Cabrales, in charge of the government action during the Palace of Justice
incident, for irregularities committed at that time. The government response and that of the
political elite and armed forces was to support Arias Cabrales whole-heartedly and attack the then
Attorney General, who was forced to resign. The major print media stated, "[Arias Cabrales] is
a soldier of democracy. . . a protagonist in a heroic situation in defense of the law and democratic
institutionalism." COMISI6N ANDINA DE JURISTAS, LIMA, INFORMATIVO ANDINO, No. 48,
SANCIONES POR LA MASACRE DEL PALACIO DE JUSTICIA 2 (1990). This support for the general
reflected a generalized feeling in the government that the defense of the state and its institutions
predominated over the defense of the human rights of the state's citizens.
18 INsTrrUTe LATINOAMERICANO DE SERVIcIos LEGALES ALTERNATIvoS (HEREINAFTER ILSA),
PORTAVOZ, No. 24, EL GOBIERNO NACIONAL DEBE RESPONDER POR ALIRIO DE JESUS P.DRAZA
10 (1990).
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Another recent attack against human rights groups took place on February
25, 1991, when Alcides Castrill6n was assassinated in Bogota. Castrill6n was
a member of the National Human Rights, Displaced Persons and Refugee
Coordinator of Colombia (CONADHEGS), and of the Colombian Association
for Development and Social Assistance (ASCODAS), two organizations which
work nationally on behalf of victims of counterinsurgency operations and,
particularly, displaced persons or internal refugees. Castrill6n himself was
displaced from his birthplace in the department of Meta (south of Bogotd), when
following death threats and harassment he was forced to move to Bogota with
his wife and seven children. Just a week prior to his assassination, while
representing the CONADHEGS, Castrill6n had attended a human rights
commission meeting of the Attorney General's office and Bogotd based human
rights organizations, at which time he had denounced government abuses against
civilians during counterinsurgency operations.19
C. "Low Intensity Conflict" and "Dirty War"
In Colombia, the situation of human rights violations is known as the
"dirty war." The dirty war is a strategy of the National Security Doctrine
upheld by the Colombian government. It consists of relentless "low intensity
conflicts" to combat guerrilla insurgency. The fundamental premise of this
doctrine is that in order to stop the guerrilla insurgents, the government-alleged
support base of the guerrillas must be eliminated. The type of political and
social groups attacked under such a policy of low intensity conflict have led
Colombians to describe this "dirty war" as a "war of intolerance." In Latin
America, this notion is translated as such: "The water must be taken away from
the fish," the water being the alleged support and the fish the guerrillas. This
doctrine, and the concept of low intensity conflict, has resulted in the
persecution of vast sectors of the political and social opposition. In the case of
Colombia, it has included legal left-wing parties, grass-roots groups, labor
leaders, peasant and indigenous leaders, and human rights workers.
The case of the Patriotic Union party (UP) exemplifies the extent of this
policy of intolerance. Formed in 1985 following the amnesty of some guerrillas
during a failed peace plan, the UP has faced incessant persecution by the armed
forces and paramilitary groups. This persecution has resulted in the
assassination of over 1,000 of its members, including two presidential candidates
- Jaime Pardo Leal, assassinated in October 1987, and Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa,
assassinated in March 1990. This persecution has not ceased despite the fact
that Colombia is supposedly opening up its democratic process, allowing for the
incorporation of the M-19 and EPL guerrillas into the Constituent Assembly and
'9 See COMISI6N DE DENUNCIA Y SOLIDARIDAD, COORDINADORA NACIONAL DE DERECHOS
HUMANOS, DAMNIFICADOS Y REFUcADOS DE COLOMBIA: DENUNCIA PUBLICA, iLA GUERRA SUCIA
sE ENSARA CONTRA LOS DAMNIFICADOS! (1991).
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into the government20 . According to recent statistics, in the first two months
of 1991, over 50 members of the UP have been assassinated or disappeared.2
The labor movement has suffered a similar fate. In 1986, several labor
unions joined together to form the United Workers Federation (CUT). Since
then, over 350 of its members have been assassinated.22 This systematic
elimination of the political and social opposition has reached levels that defy
hyperbole, as has the intolerance associated with it. As a result, Colombia is
experiencing the phenomenon of "social clean-up operations": the systematic
elimination of "undesirables" and the dispossessed in Colombian society.
"Social clean-up operations" are aimed primarily against beggars, prostitutes,
homosexuals, street children, thieves and drug addicts. In some cases there is
evidence of police involvement in this practice.' In 1990, 267 Colombians fell
prey to this form of violence.24
D. Counterinsurgency and The Dirty War
Finally, within the context of the dirty war, human rights groups in
Colombia and abroad have denounced abuses committed by government military
forces against civilians during counterinsurgency operations. Such abuses
include continual aerial bombardments against civilians, mainly peasants, who
live in rural areas. Over the past two years, numerous cases have been
denounced, particularly in the departments of Meta, Santander and Antioquia.?
Other abuses include the massacre of civilians by military forces during
counterinsurgency operations, presumably in revenge for guerrilla actions. A
good example of this took place on June 7, 1990 in the town of Macaravita,
o Following the demobilization of the M-19 in early 1990, and the presidential elections of May
1990, President C~sar Gaviria Trujillo named an M-19 leader as Health Minister. The M-19
political party - the Democratic Alliance (AD M-19) - won almost a third of the seats in the
Constituent Assembly elections in December 1990. While the government uses this example to
promote an international image of tolerance and democratic expansion, other sectors - primarily the
UP party - continue to be excluded as noted in the incessant persecution of party members.
21 See UNI6N PATRI6TICA, OFICINA DE DEREcHOS HUMANOS Y OFICINA DE PRENSA,
ASESINATO DE DIRIGENTES Y SIMPATIZANTES DE LA UNI61 PATRI6TICA Y DEL PARTIDO
COMUNISTA COLOMBIANO EN LOS MESES DE ENERO Y FEBRERO-91 (July 26, 1991).
See U.N. ESCOR, supra note 13, at 45-47.
Seminario del Grupo de Trabajo Internacional de Derechos Humanos en Colombia (Mar.
1991)(memoria of meeting). Among the agenda items of the seminar was an analysis of the
regional and national context of human rights in Colombia. In all the regions addressed - Caldas,
Risaralda, Santander, Boyac, C6rdoba, Cauca, BogotA, Meta, Antioquia, among others - the
participants denounced the existence of "social clean-up operations." Upon examining the situation
of Cauca, the participants of the seminar stressed the responsibility of members of the police forces.
In other regions of the country, participants suggested that "social clean-up operations" received
"official" support.
24 See Comit6 Intercongregacional de Justicia y Paz, 3 PAZ Y JuSTICIA, No. 4, at 91 (1990).
2 See U.N. Escor, supra note 13, at 45-47.
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Province of Garcfa Rovira, Department of Santander. Eleven peasants
belonging to one family were massacred by the army following an incident
involving guerrilla insurgents. Among the victims were an elderly 87 year-old
man and a nine year-old child. The army claimed that the victims were
guerrillas. However, forensic doctors later showed that the peasants were
dressed in military uniforms following their deaths, as the bullets that caused
their fatal wounds did not pierce the clothing they wore.26 The Attorney
General's office has opened an investigation into this case, charging a lieutenant
colonel and other officers of the V Brigade of the army for this crime.27
A similar case took place in May 1990 in the town of Puerto Valdivia,
Antioquia. Following a guerrilla incursion, several peasants were detained-
disappeared by the army. Their bodies were later found in a common grave in
a nearby plantation. The then commander of the IV Brigade of the Army stated
that the peasants were guerrillas who had died in armed combat although a
forensic doctor later clarified that the peasants showed signs of torture and some
had even been strangled to death. A commission of the Attorney General's
office went to Puerto Valdivia to investigate the murder of the peasants. After
informing the army about their mission, they set out to interview peasant
survivors. The investigative commission was then forced to cut short its visit
when the army began aerial bombardments of the area.28
IV. THE WAR ON DRUGS
An overview of Colombia's human rights crisis would not be complete
without addressing the so-called "war on drugs." Following the August 1989
murders of important Colombian figures, including Liberal party presidential
candidate Luis Carlos Galin, the government of President Virgilio Barco
declared war on "The Extraditables," drug traffickers sought for extradition to
the United States. "The Extraditables" responded in kind. The most publicized
of the violent methods used by "The Extraditables" were the November 1989
explosion aboard an Avianca airplane and the December 1989 bombing of the
Colombian secret police (DAS) headquarters in Bogotd; these incidents resulted
in the deaths of hundreds of innocent people.29
6 See COMISI6N ANDINA DE JURISTAS SECCIONAL COLOMBIANA, PANORAMA DE LOS
DERECHOS HUMANOS EN COLOMBIA: ENTRE LAS "GUERRAS" Y LA MODERNIZACI6N AUTORITARIA
(1990).
2 While this investigation is admirable, it should be noted that only a few token cases of human
rights abuses involving state forces have led to sanctions by the Attorney General's office.
Furthermore, the highest sanction this office may impose is the recommendation to remove officers
from military or police service. Several cases analyzed by human rights groups show that this
recommendation to remove has been followed by a promotion of the officer in question.
28 See COMISI6N ANDINA DE JURISTAS, LIMA, INFORMATIVO ANDINO No. 43, LucHA
CONTRAINSURGENTE Y VIOLACI6N DE LOS DERECHOS HuMANOs 4 (1990).
29 See COMISI6N ANDINA DE JURISTAS, LIMA, INFoRMATIvO ANDiNo No. 38, REFORMA
CONSTrrUCIONAL, PROCESO DE PAZ Y "GUERRA AL NARCOTRAFICO" 2,3 (1990).
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Human rights monitors in Colombia and abroad recognize the complex
situation generated by the drug traffickers - particularly their use of violence.
At the same time, many of the monitors have concluded that the waging of a
twar on drugs" by the government only aggravates the problem of human rights
in the country and does not prove truly effective in combatting the problem of
drug exports. The two reasons for this conclusion arise from the principal
tactics used by the Colombian government to combat drug traffickers: (1) the
government's reliance on state of siege legislation; and (2) the government's
implementation of a military strategy to deal with what is essentially a law
enforcement problem.
A. State of Siege Legislation
The Colombian government's reliance on state of siege legislation has
resulted in the continuous limitation of civil liberties and judicial guarantees.
These limitations have expanded continuously over the past 15 years since the
promulgation of the "Security Statute" under the government of President
Turbay in the late 1970s. Recently, however, civil rights in general, and the
rights of the detained and accused in particular, have become even more
negligible under the "war on drugs." As it is impossible to give an exhaustive
analysis of state of siege legislation at this time, I shall concentrate on the latest
such decrees.
Ancillary to the declaration of war against the drug traffickers, and
particularly the Medellfn cartel, in August 1989 the government of President
Barco promulgated several anti-drug decrees. The principal decree, No. 180,
was said to be aimed against drug traffickers, yet used the terminology
"terrorist" to describe the violent actors it was defined to target. The decree
never actually mentioned the words "drug trafficker." Ultimately, decree No.
180 was used, as has other state of siege legislation, to thwart social and grass-
roots organizations? 0
In 1990, the government of President Gaviria, also preoccupied by the
violence of the drug traffickers, promulgated decree No. 2790, which came into
force on January 16, 1991. This decree, named the "Statute in Defense of
Justice," is intended to protect the judiciary, the government branch most
influenced by the violence and threats of the drug traffickers (particularly "The
Extraditables"). In essence, however, this "Statute in Defense of Justice" does
quite the contrary.
30 Among other cases, the following is worth citing. After the promulgation of this decree, four
members of the Grass-roots Education Institute (Instituto Popular de Capacitaci6n, a non-
governmental organization based in Medellin) were detained and held incommunicado under charges
of participating in "terrorist" activity. While under detention the four underwent psychological and
physical torture. Weeks following their arrest they were released for lack of evidence. COMISI6N
ANDINA DE JURISTAS, LIMA, INFORMATIVO ANDINO No. 34, ExcEsos EN LA LucmA ANTIDROGAS
(1989).
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Briefly, the "Statute in Defense of Justice" details "terrorist" type crimes
(including kidnapping, extorsion and murder) and creates a separate self-
contained penal code excepted from the general criminal law to deal with such
crimes. Among the exceptional powers allowed by this state of siege legislation
are:
(A) The possibility of holding the detained incommunicado for up to eight
days, during which time the person does not have the right to a defense
or to a lawyer;
(B) The restriction of habeas corpus whereby such a writ may be brought
before any judicial authority but may only be resolved before the Superior
Public Order Tribunal (in charge of reviewing cases of "terrorism") which
is based solely in Bogotd, thus effectively impeding a speedy resolution;
(C) The detailing of "passive" crimes whereby a person may be arrested
for a crime committed by an organization of which he/she is a member
despite the fact that he/she did not commit the offense;
(D) The lifting of all statutory time limitations;
(E) The militarization of the judicial investigation process, whereby
investigative units may consist entirely of, or be staffed by, military
personnel and, in such cases, conducted under the authority of the
commanding military officer, including the commander of a military
quarter or base;
(F) The discretion granted to these investigative units to gather evidence,
including those consisting entirely of the military (prior to this decree,
and in accordance with the legal tradition of Colombia, the judge in
charge of a case ordered the gathering of evidence and supervised its
collection);
(G) The possibility granted to police and military forces to conduct
"generic" house searches; that is, specifying a block or neighborhood
rather than a specific address. A warrant must be requested from a judge
to conduct such searches, but the "Statute in Defense of Justice" allows
for an exception should a judge not be available at the time;,
(H) And, finally, the secrecy factor. The statute allows for secret or
invisible judges (presumably to protect their identity and lives), secret
prosecutors, secret investigative units, secret witnesses, secret informants,
secret evidence and even secret dossiers.3 2
These are only a few of the many human rights abuses permitted by this
decree in order, allegedly, to defend the judges. The persons prejudiced by
these measures are the accused. Numerous defense attorneys have stated that
31 The Supreme Court declared this power unconstitutional in April 1991. The other powers
of decree No. 2790, however, were left untouched.
32 For an overview of Decree No. 2790, see COMBSI6N ANDINA DE JURLSTAS SECCIONAL
COLOMBIANA, UNA JUSTICIA AMENAzADA: COMENTARIOS AL ESTATUTO PARA LA DEFENSA DE
LA JUSTICIA (1991).
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they no longer have a function within the judicial system since this statute has
made their task impossible. Among other things, the weighing of proof and the
secret nature of some evidence and witnesses makes the job of the defense a
herculean task. Human rights workers are deeply concerned because they feel
this statute may be used summarily to detain social and political opponents of the
government. Others also fear that the time a detainee may be held
incommunicado and the absolute ineffectiveness of the writ of habeas corpus
may allow for more of the severe human rights abuses which have already been
witnessed in the country: the practice of torture, enforced disappearances and
even extrajudicial executions.
B. Military Strategy and Innocent Victims
The other primary tactic used by the Colombian government to combat
drug trafficking has been the militarization of the law enforcement: the "war on
drugs." This strategy has proven itself capable of increasing the violence in the
country but not in effectively stopping the drug problem. The case of the "war"
waged in Medellfn, headquarters of the drug cartel led by Pablo Escobar, is
indeed telling.
During one of the many episodes of the "war on drugs," "The
Extraditables" once more declared war on the state, this time against the police
in Medellfn. The reason: accusations from "The Extraditables" that the police
were torturing and disappearing members of its network. On April 1, 1990,
police officers started being assassinated in Medellfn. By the time this "battle"
subsided in July 1990, some 150 police officers had been assassinated. "The
Extraditables" were reportedly offering $4,000 for each police officer killed and
another $80,000 for each member of the elite force kidnapped or
assassinated.33 The end result was a dramatic increase in the number of
homicides in the city. During the first six months of 1990, soffe 3,160 civilians
were murdered along with the police. This number of homicides in Medellfn -
averaging 17 daily - is greater than all the political or allegedly political
assassinations reported during the entire year.
Although it is not clear who is responsible for the deaths of these civilians
(in Colombia numerous actors are responsible for -the situation of violence),
several press statements and a general chronological reconstruction of events
would suggest that the police were involved in the assassination of civilians.
According to a Medellfn politician: "The massacres in the neighborhoods [of
Medellfn] are in retaliation for the assassination of police agents. Some of the
death squads are formed by Metropolitan Police who . . . decided to take the
11 The elite force of the police was created in April 1989. Its primary function was to combat
paramilitary groups although it emphasized the persecution of alleged drug traffickers and
counterinsurgency operations.
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law in their hands to avenge their dead colleagues. '"I The fact that the
violence increased under the militarization of the city, but dropped dramatically
once the military lost some of its power to control civilian neighborhoods and
the majority of the police forces changed, also points to this conclusion."
Finally, a press article reporting on the situation in Medellfn, the fear of its
citizens, and the problem of violence in general, quoted a police spokesperson
who shed more light on the civilian homicides:
That death trade, said the officer, was of concern to the high
command of the institution (the police), who began to suspect not
only that some police officers would kill the young men but also
that these same officers could be tempted by the money offered into
killing one another and quickly decided to make thousands of
changes and transfers in order to avoid what may have already
occurred.36
C. Decriminalization vs. Selective Justice
The irony of the "war on drugs" is that while authoritarian judicial
measures are put forth and a military strategy is implemented, both severely
affecting human rights overall, the government has also passed state of siege
decrees that allow for drug traffickers, and paramilitaries, to turn themselves in,
receive reduced penalties and, in certain cases, virtual amnesty for their crimes.
These decrees - Nos. 2047 and 3030 of 1990 and 303 of 1991 - eliminate the
threat of extradition for traffickers that turn themselves in, allow for the
reduction of jail sentences and other penalties and, especially with respect to
paramilitary groups, allow for release on probation with the simple turning over
of weapons. As a result, the government has virtually decriminalized the
activities of this sector of Colombian society that is responsible for so much
violence. It is. this last contradiction in the "war on drugs" - decriminalization
of certain crimes including those carried out-by paramilitary groups, coupled
with the severe authoritarian measures described earlier - that has led analysts
to conclude that the current drug policy is to be lenient with certain sectors - ie.,
drug traffickers and paramilitaries who do not pose a threat to the status quo,
and use an iron fist to deal with opposition forces that are nonconformist and
considered a threat to the "democratic" status quo in Colombian society.
V. THE ROLE OF U.S. AID
Within this context of the war on drugs and the dirty war in Colombia,
the United States government plays an increasing role. Under the guise of
3 Anonymous, jGuerra Civil en Medellfn?, SEMANA, No. 426, at 23 (3 July 1990).
1 For more information see ILSA I HUMAN RIGHTS WORKING PAPER, No. 1, Is U.S. ANTI-
NARCOTICS ASSISTANCE PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE IN COLOMBIA? (1991).
1 Anonymous, jQuignes Son Esos Priscos?, LA PRENSA 2 (3 March 1991).
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combatting drugs, the U.S. has offered greater amounts of aid to the country,.
particularly military aid. Analysts feel that this increase in aid to Colombia, and
the Andean region as a whole, reflects a desire to maintain hegemony in Latin
America. As the "cold war" shifts to the "drug war," so does attention from
Central America to the Andes. This shift in attention includes new recipients
for U.S. military advisors and equipment.
37
U.S. aid has had a relatively significant impact on the human rights
situation in Colombia. For one thing, U.S. pressure upon the government to
extradite drug traffickers to the United States has led to reiterated outbursts of
violence from the drug traffickers in response. This effort has only aided in
fueling the violence. In terms of military assistance, the United States' Andean
Initiative - created after the February 1990 drug summit of the presidents of
Bolivia, Colombia, Peni and the United States in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia
- has promoted the intention to c6mbat drugs on the military front. In essence,
since August 1989, all the U.S. aid granted or budgeted for Colombia has had
a military emphasis, outnumbering at a ratio of two to one the aid offered to the
police forces (acknowledged to be the institution most capable in
counternarcotics). Furthermore, this military aid has been diverted by the
Colombian government - as a result of a lack of due oversight by or even the
acquiescence of the U.S. government - for use in counterinsurgency activities.38
Finally, the aid granted to Colombia has allowed for a police training component
- because of a loophole in U.S. human rights legislation which banned such
training in the 1970s after it proved to indirectly promote human rights abuse.
Colombia faces a human rights crisis and a grave situation of political
violence in which state security, military and police forces are not immune from
culpability. The Colombian government has not shown its political will to
prosecute members of these forces for human rights violations nor has it purged
these forces to rid them of dangerous elements. This means that United States
7 "Now that the cold war is over, the armed services have become eager participants in the
drug war. 'It's their new meal ticket now that the commies are not their big threat,' says a
congressional staffer." Waller, Miller, Barry & Reiss, RISKY BUsINESS: As ITS INVOLVEMENT IN
THE DRUG WAR GROWS, THE PENTAGON OUTLINES A PLAN TO CRUSH THE CARTELS, Newsweek
16 (16 July 1991).
1 According to a report by the Committee on Government Operations of the U.S. House of
Representatives, not only has the U.S. government given higher amounts of aid to the military
forces, it also has given aid to the police which is not considered a priority. Furthermore and with
respect to the deviation of this aid, a U.S. embassy official in Bogoti was quoted as saying:
While the assistance is being provided under the auspices of narcotics control, it is
generally understood that the assistance is to be used to control narcotics trafficking
as well as insurgency activities . . . . [It] was not U.S. policy to tell the
Colombians what equipment they needed or how to use the United States-provided
assets. THIRTEEN REPORT BY THE COMMITrEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
supra note 14, at 80-81.
The United States granted Colombia $65 million in August 1989 under Section 506(a) of the
Foreign Assistance Act. In FY90, $60.3 million was granted to Colombia under the Andean
Initiative and another $80.5 million was forecast for FY91. In all cases, the Colombian military
has received - or is forecast to receive - over 65% of the aid, which includes military hardware.
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aid and policy is in effect an incentive for the Colombian state to continue with
abusive practices. It is also, most unfortunately, a set of physical weapons with
which to conduct them.
The United States 1990 Drug Control Act, along with measures such as
Sections 502(b) and 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, provide for certain
stardards by which to measure eligibility for military and police aid. The United
States government should review its aid to Colombia in light of this legislation.
Most independent international human rights reports show that in the context of
this U.S. legislation, Colombia should not be granted such aid.
VI. CONCLUSION
This brief overview of Colombia's human rights situation has attempted
to show that the country is undergoing a crisis. The systemic abuse of basic
rights is one symptom of this crisis. Human rights organizations in Colombia
have continually reiterated in their public reports and denunciations conclusions
reached by international and intergovernmental monitors. This has included
emphasizing that counterinsurgency and counternarcotics efforts cannot and
should not override respect for human rights and the upholding of democratic
principles.
Three basic suggestions arise from this brief overview of Colombia's
human rights situation. First, the Colombian government needs to review its
domestic law and practices in order to amend them to conform with its
constitutionally recognized international human rights obligations. In this
respect, state of siege legislation in particular should be revised in order to
guarantee the basic rights of accused and detained persons. Second, the United
States government should review its own policy with respect to the granting of
military aid to countries known to be systematic violators of internationally
recognized human rights. And, third, both -the United States and Colombia
should revise their overall strategies regarding counterinsurgency and narcotics
control. Neither the war against guerrillas nor the war on drugs should be
waged as a dirty war.
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